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The FBI's Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be
Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and Why There Is
Nothing You Can Do About It
PETER J. GEORGITON*
Much controversy has arisen over the FBI's proposal to use an e-mail and
Internet surveillance program, named "Carnivore, " to assist its law enforcement
efforts on the Information Superhighway. In this note, the author examines how
Carnivore operates and its implications for individuals 'privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA). The author concludes that the current state of constitutional and
statutory law governing electronic surveillance indicates that the FBI can utilize
Carnivore to conduct a wide range of intrusive searches with little or no legal
justification. Carnivore's ability to retrieve more than mere e-mail messages of
suspects, the FBI's checkered past on privacy issues, and the lack of judicial
oversight make the potential for abuse of Carnivore great. As a result, Congress
must take a hard look at both the ECPA and Carnivore to prevent law
enforcement agencies from using Carnivore to peer into our personal e-mails
and Internet usage.
Whether he wrote DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER, or whether he refrained from
writing it, made no difference.... The Thought Police would get him just the
same. He had committed-would still have committed, even if he had never set
pen to paper-the essential crime that contained all others in itself
Thoughtcrime, they called it. Thoughtcrime was not a thing that could be
concealed forever. You might dodge successfully for a while, even for years, but
sooner or later they were bound to get you. **
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Justice Department have
recently come under fire after a revelation by The Wall Street Journal of the
existence of Carnivore, a computer software program capable of searching
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countless numbers of e-mails in order to find potential terrorists, pedophiles,
hackers, and other persons using the information superhighway to commit
crimes.' Carnivore operates as a "packet sniffer," catching bits and pieces of data
sent from one Internet user to another and then reassembling them for the FBI to
examine.2 Tests have shown Carnivore to be highly effective at filtering e-mail
messages for criminal content, and it is this high rate of effectiveness that raises
serious privacy concerns.3 Of paramount concern is that the FBI might unleash
Carnivore on thousands of unsuspecting users of the Internet in an attempt to find
the criminals among us, and, in the process, examine the content of personal e-
mails and invade our privacy. The FBI has tried to dispel privacy concerns
regarding Carnivore, contending that a warrant is required before any agent can
conduct a search, and that any unauthorized searches would result in criminal and
civil liability for the agent.4
' See Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps To Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3. The FBI has recently backed away from likening its surveillance
equipment to flesh eating animals as "Carnivore" is now simply referred to as "DCS-100."
Larry Kahaner, Hungry for Your E-Mail - IT Managers and ISPs Fear FBI E-Mail Monitoring
Device Will Hurt Systems and Invade Privacy, INFORMATIONWEEK, Apr. 23, 2001, at 59. For
ease of recognition, the term "Carnivore" will be used throughout this note to refer to the FBI's
e-mail and Internet surveillance tool.
2See Md. Qaisar Alam, E-Mail Surveillance: Carnivore Cornered, COMPUTERS TODAY,
Oct. 31, 2000, at 48. "Packet sniffer" refers to Carnivore's form of searching information sent
out over the Internet. Id. When sent from a user's computer to another computer on the Internet,
web info, e-mail, and other Internet data are split up into individual parts or "packets." Id. The
destination computers, upon receiving the packets, reassemble them and display them to the
other user. Id. Carnivore intercepts each of the individual packets as they pass over the Internet,
"sniffing" them to determine whether or not they contain objectionable material. Id. Packets
that trigger Carnivore's search criteria are then copied onto Carnivore's hard drive. Id. The FBI
later reassembles the packets to find out the contents of the data. Id.
3 Although Carnivore is championed by the FBI as a tool to be used solely for searching e-
mails, an independent report by the Illinois Institute of Technology (commissioned at the
request of the Department of Justice) revealed that the program is capable of "view[ing] the
content of e-mail messages, HTfP [web] pages, FTP sessions, etc." Stephen P. Smith et al.,
Independent Review of the Carnivore System ix (Dec. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Carnivore
Independent Review], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/camiv final.pdf.
4 In a series of hearings during Summer 2000 on Capitol Hill, the FBI stated that all
searches must be conducted pursuant to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA). Thus, before a Carnivore search could begin, the FBI must obtain a court-ordered
warrant supported by probable cause, and agents who go beyond the warrant's search
parameters would be subject to criminal and civil penalties under the Act. See Donald M. Kerr,
Statement for the Record of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, on Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, Before the United States Senate, The
Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/
congress00/kerr090600.htm (Sept. 6, 2000). The gist of Mr. Kerr's statement to Congress was
that the ECPA provides sufficient protections to prevent Carnivore from being abused. Kerr
emphasized that "[u]nder this law, the FBI cannot, and does not, 'snoop,"' because warrants
issued under the ECPA must be sufficiently particular and state "the offenses being committed,
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Comforting as the FBI's assurances may sound, the current status of the
constitutional and statutory law governing electronic surveillance indicates that
the FBI is free to conduct a wide range of intrusive searches with Carnivore. This
note will examine the overlooked privacy implications of Carnivore's uses. In
particular, this note will focus on the fact that, if used in the limited capacity that
the FBI publicly intends, Carnivore is perfectly legal under the constitutional and
federal statutory framework in place today. However, Carnivore's capacity for
searching through more than just e-mail of known criminal suspects, coupled with
the FBI's checkered past on privacy issues and the lack ofjudicial oversight make
the potential for abuse great. As a result, Congress will need to take a hard look at
both the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and Carnivore
and add new protections to prevent Carnivore from becoming the ever-peering
eye of the government.
Part 11 of this note will examine Carnivore's background, why the FBI
determined that it was necessary, and how Carnivore operates during a typical
search. Part III will examine the constitutional framework governing searches
involving Carnivore. It will ask whether e-mail users have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their mail such as to require probable cause to justify a
search. It will also demonstrate that this expectation of privacy may not extend to
all searches conducted with Carnivore, leaving the FBI free to conduct searches
without probable cause. Part IV of this note will examine the constitutional
requirement of particularity in warrants for seizure of documents and explore this
requirement's interaction with searches of e-mail messages using Carnivore. Part
V will examine Congress' response to perceived weaknesses in the constitutional
doctrine in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and
demonstrate how the ECPA is insufficient to protect e-mail users from
unauthorized searches by the FBI. Part VI will discuss how the lack of neutral,
third-party oversight of the FBI's use of Carnivore, coupled with the FBI's past
history of abuse, makes it possible for the FBI to use Carnivore to "snoop" around
in our personal e-mails. Finally, Part VII will discuss some potential remedies
Congress could use to protect the public from invasions of privacy by devices like
Carnivore.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why is Carnivore Necessary?
According to the FBI, the growth of the Internet over the last five years has
led to increased use of the "Information Superhighway" by "terrorists, spies,
the communications facility regarding which the subject's communications are to be
intercepted, a description of the types of conversations to be intercepted, and the identities of the
persons committing the offenses and anticipated to be intercepted." Id.
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hackers, and dangerous criminals... to carry out their heinous acts."' In a
statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Donald M. Kerr, Assistant
Director of the FBI's Laboratory Division, cited Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) information that various foreign and domestic terrorist groups use e-mail
and other Internet resources to further their causes.6 In addition, Kerr referred to
other concerns of national and domestic security such as espionage, "'information
warfare' by foreign militaries against [the United States'] critical infrastructures,"
sexual exploitation of children, and serious fraud.7 In the FBI's view, Carnivore,
by automatically filtering and intercepting e-mails of suspects listed in warrants,
provides an efficient way to gather incriminating evidence without offending the
Fourth Amendment or the federal electronic privacy laws.8
B. How Carnivore Works
At first glance, the Carnivore program does not appear any different from a
program one might run on one's home, Windows-based computer. The visual set
up is very familiar: the program is accessed through the click of an icon, and the
main program has an active window with the traditional "minimize,"
"maximize," and "close" buttons at the upper right hand comer of the screen. But
the similarities end with the title screen, which immediately foreshadows the
powerful nature of this program by displaying a small graphic of blood-soaked
teeth "chomping" on a meal of binary numbers.9 Compounding these differences
is the fact that the computer from which the Carnivore program is operated is
merely a workstation connected via a telephone network to the main Carnivore
computer located at the Internet Service Provider's (ISP's) headquarters.
Carnivore has no monitor or keyboard, and the computer it uses is enclosed in a
locked, black box connected to the outside world only through a direct connection
5 Id.
6 id.
7 Id. Some of the examples cited by Kerr included CIA information that terrorist groups
such as Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Osama Bin Laden's Qa'ida group were using computer files
and e-mail for their terrorist planning. Kerr also stated that since countries know that they
cannot beat the U.S. with their military forces, they are instead targeting "our growing
dependence on information technology in government and commercial operations." Particularly
interesting was Kerr's citing of a Russian official's comments that "an attack on a national
infrastructure could, 'by virtue of its catastrophic consequences, completely overlap with the
use of [weapons] of mass destruction."' Id.
8 Id. The FBI contends that protection of individuals' constitutional rights was what it had
in mind in creating Carnivore, as many commercial "sniffers" or search tools "collect either too
much information, such as collecting all of the information regarding a given criminal subject's
account, or, alternatively, fail to collect the authorized information at all." Id.
9 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Carnivore Test Procedure Special Service
Pack Update, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore/testl.html (Sept. 27, 2000) (containing
Carnivore materials requested by the Electronic Privacy Information Center under the Freedom
of Information Act).
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to the ISP's mainframe and a phone line to the FBI offices.' 0 To operate
Carnivore, the FBI agent inputs the search ("filter") criteria, which can include
particular Internet ports, specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses," Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3) addresses,' 2
individual usemames for a particular Internet or e-mail account, and specific text
strings contained in e-mails.'3
Once the filter criteria have been established, the Carnivore program is run
from the FBI's office, and the computer located next to the ISP's server begins to
search for e-mail that meet the criteria. When an Internet user sends e-mail to
another location on the Internet, it is typically broken into individual "packets." '4
These packets may travel different routes to the final destination where, upon
arrival, they are assembled into a whole e-mail message again.' 5 Carnivore acts as
a "packet sniffer" by intercepting packets that meet the FBI's pre-established
search criteria.' 6 The intercepted packets are saved on a Jazz disk (a special
magnetic disk that can hold two gigabytes of information, or enough information
to fill 1,400 high density floppy disks),' 7 and then retrieved by an FBI agent who
travels to the ISP's headquarters, unlocks Carnivore, and removes the disk. 8
The packets received by the FBI are unusable unless they are reassembled
and decrypted. Programs named "Packeteer" and "Coolminer" take the
10 Many privacy advocates and ISPs have been concerned about Carnivore's mysterious
nature. Because it is located in a locked, black box, even the ISP cannot be sure what Carnivore
is retrieving. Ultimately, only the FBI knows what Internet traffic is pulled aside by Carnivore.
D. Ian Hopper, Critics Fret About FBI's Interceptor For E-Mail, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
July 12, 2000, at I IA.
" Every web site and computer connected with the Internet has a unique Internet Protocol
address, which consists of a series of numbers. For example, The Ohio State University's IP
address for its web page is "128.146.214.28". By constraining Carnivore's search to a particular
IP address, this would mean that only data from that IP address would be collected.
12 Most e-mail services have incoming (POP3) and outgoing (SMTP) mail servers. Each
of these servers in return has a unique address, which can be used to retrieve e-mail from a
remote computer using mail applications such as Microsoft Outlook or Eudora. The address for
The Ohio State University's POP3 student mail server, for example, is "pop.service.ohio-
state.edu".
13 Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at xii. Using the text-filtering feature of
Carnivore, an Agent could type specific text strings such as "bomb" and "embassy" to have
Carnivore intercept all e-mails containing those words. Id.
14 Alam, supra note 2, at 48.
15 id.
16 Id.; Carnivore Independent Report, supra note 3, at ix.
17 The Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute's report on Carnivore states that,
while the information is stored on a retrievable Jazz disk, there is no technical barrier preventing
information intercepted by Carnivore from being stored on a hard disk drive, which would
greatly increase the amount of material Carnivore would be able to retrieve and subsequently
store. See Carnivore Independent Report, supra note 3, at 3-15.
" Id. at 3-5.
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information gathered by Carnivore and reconfigure it into usable data.' If the e-
mail is encrypted to make it unreadable, other programming must be utilized for
decryption.2°
I. E-MAIL AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Carnivore's use by the FBI immediately raises concerns about potential
infringement of individuals' privacy rights. There are two principle protection
mechanisms already in place that limit the FBI's ability to use Carnivore: the
Fourth Amendment and its case law, and the ECPA. These protections ensure
that, at a minimum, the FBI must obtain a warrant if it wishes to search the
contents of e-mail or a court order if it merely wishes to use Carnivore to obtain e-
mail addresses. Questions remain, however, as to the effectiveness of these
limitations in preventing abuse of Carnivore, especially since they were created
before the explosion of Internet and e-mail usage. What is clear, however, is that
the current constitutional and statutory framework grants substantial protection
from the most intrusive searches of e-mail by Carnivore, but it has many
loopholes that leave the public unprotected from less intrusive searches.
A. The Constitutional Framework: the Fourth Amendment's Protection
from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Along with the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and
religion, the Third Amendment's protection of freedom from quartering of
soldiers, and the Fifth Amendment's protection from self-incrimination, the
Fourth Amendment is part of what one author describes as a dominant theme in
constitutional law: protecting the privacy rights of the individual from intrusion
by the federal government. 2' The Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.22
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, and in order for law
enforcement agencies such as the FBI to search one's home, there must be a
warrant, particularly describing the places and things to be searched, and
supported by evidence tending to show probable cause that the evidence to be
19 Carnivore Independent Report, supra note 3, at ix.
20 Alam, supra note 2, at 48.
Fred H. Cate, Principles ofInternet Privacy, 32 CONN. L. REV. 877, 884 (2000).
22U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
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searched and/or seized will establish the existence of a crime.23 The requirement
of a wan-ant prevents the police from rummaging through individuals' homes and
personal effects unless a neutral magistrate makes a determination that there is
probable cause to justify the intrusion.24
But in order for the Fourth Amendment's protections to apply, the
government activity must first qualify as a search or seizure. One of the first
United States Supreme Court cases to deal with the issue of whether the
interception of communications constitutes a "search" for Fourth Amendment
purposes was Olmstead v. United States.25 In Olmstead, the petitioner tried to
suppress evidence retrieved via a telephone tap placed outside of his house
because it had been obtained without a warrant. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Taft recognized that a person has privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment in certain places, such as the home, but nonetheless held that the
phone tap did not constitute a search and therefore did not require a warrant
because the tap was placed outside of the home.26
This view of personal rights under the Fourth Amendment held firm until the
Court revisited the issue of phone taps in Katz v. United States.27 In Katz, the
defendant was charged with placing bets over the phone in violation of federal
law. The government based its case against Katz in part on conversations made
by him in a public telephone booth, which had an electronic listening and
recording device attached to it by the FBI. Though the government contended that
taps of public phone booths did not violate one's right to privacy or constitute a
search, the Court dramatically reformulated privacy doctrine by holding that the
"Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 28 The Court noted that, despite
the fact that phone booths are made of clear glass and are located in public, a
person who uses the telephone expects their conversations to remain private.29
23 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
24 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
2' 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
26 Id. at 465. Chief Justice Taft stated:
The [Fourth A]mendment does not forbid what was done here [installing a phone tap
outside of a house]. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants .... [Tihe intervening wires are not part of his house or office
any more than are highways along which they are stretched.
Id. at 464.
27 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Id. at 351.
29 Id. at 352. The Court noted that at the time of the decision, the telephone had become
accepted as a vehicle of private conversation:
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a
person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a
call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
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Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz set up the two-pronged test used by the
Court today in determining whether government activity constitutes a search and
implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests. The first prong is a subjective
test: whether the person has an actual expectation of privacy. The second prong is
objective: whether society is prepared to accept the person's expectation of
privacy as reasonable.3 ° Taken together, the question asked is whether the person
who is being observed has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
While it provides much comfort to know that the FBI must have a warrant
before it can search certain things in which one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, what exactly constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is often
unclear. The easy cases deal with situations involving face-to-face searches of our
homes or searches involving established technology, such as when authorities
listen in on phone calls using phone taps. However, what about e-mail? Can a
user of an e-mail service have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the
contents of his or her e-mail so that the FBI must first flash a warrant at a terrified,
twenty-something computer tech at America Online (AOL) before it starts sorting
through users' love letters? The answer is that it depends on what type of e-mail
service one is using and on how much information agencies like the FBI want.
1. Searches of Home E-Mail
The type of e-mail most near and dear to people's privacy concerns is their
home e-mail accounts, which are utilized everyday for various types of
communications, and which most people would probably expect to remain
private. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to address whether
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in our personal home e-mail accounts,
and there is little case law directed to the issue as well. But overall, the courts that
have addressed the issue have found that people do indeed have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their e-mail communications made from their personal
accounts.31
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.
Id. This quote parallels the current state of e-mail, for as our dependence on it has grown, our
expectation that our e-mail communications will remain private has increased.
3 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Applying the test, Justice Harlan states that it is
natural for there to be times where we expect our phone calls made from a public phone booth
to remain private. Even though the phone booth is located in public, as a society we recognize
that at times "it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable." Id.
31 In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to
extend existing wiretap protections to electronic communications, such as e-mail. Though there
had not been a judicial determination of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
e-mail at that point, the House Judiciary Committee's report suggested that this would be the
course the courts would follow. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 17 (1986).
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The leading case addressing the issue of privacy in personal e-mail accounts
was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in
United States v. Maxwell,32 in which an AOL user reported to the press that he
had received child pornography through the Internet service. In response to the
complaint, AOL notified the FBI, which subsequently searched the account files
of the defendant, an Air Force colonel, on the AOL central computers. The search
included his personal e-mails and recovered pornographic materials. Though the
FBI had obtained a warrant to search the files at AOL, there were many
indications that the search in fact had exceeded the authority of the warrant.3 3
The court was thus confronted with the issue of whether the defendant had
standing to contest the search in the first place by demonstrating that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his AOL e-mail account.34 At the outset, the
court noted the difference between e-mails accessed with the AOL service and
simple messages posted on the Internet, the former of which "are afforded more
privacy... because they are privately stored for retrieval on AOL's centralized
and privately-owned computer bank .... , In addition, the court relied upon
testimony of AOL officials who stated that AOL, as a matter of policy, would not
read or disclose its members' e-mails to anyone, unless authorized by the user or
served with a court order.36 In light of this policy and the private nature of e-mails
32 45 M.J. 406, 412 (Ct. App. A.F. 1996). The user in this case had originally reported the
receipt of child pornography to his local law enforcement officials, but after receiving no
assistance, subsequently took his case to the press.33 Id. at 416. The court noted that AOL employees-and not FBI agents--conducted the
search, the warrant had "at least 20 or more errors," the seizure "exceeded the plain language of
the warrant," and AOL did not rely on the warrant in designing search programs to search its
files. Id.34 Id. Sensing the new ground in privacy law this case was treading, the court commented:
[P]ersonal computers, hooked up to large networks, are so widely used that the scope of
Fourth Amendment core concepts of 'privacy' as applied to them must be reexamined.
Consequently, this opinion and the ones surely to follow will affect each one of us who has
logged onto the "information superhighway."
Id. at 410.351d. at 417.36 Id. Indeed, the prevalence of similar privacy policies at other Intemet Service Providers
enhances users' expectation of privacy in their e-mail communications. CompuServe explicitly
states in its Terms of Use agreement that it will not read users' e-mails: "You are solely
responsible for your e-mail ... and acknowledge that CompuServe acts as a passive conduit for
the transmission of such data." However, CompuServe alerts users that it is "legally obligated to
provide member e-mail information (including actual e-mail messages... ) if served with
proper legal documentation" by law enforcement authorities under the provisions of the ECPA.
CompuServe USA, CompuServe Privacy Policy, at http://www.compuserve.com/login/
LoginTermsofService.asp (Sep. 30, 2001). Other e-mail services, such as Microsoft's Hotmail,
guarantee privacy of user information, but do not explicitly guarantee privacy of the contents of
e-mails:
MSN is committed to protecting your privacy and developing technology that gives you
18392001] CARNIVORE
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sent using AOL, the court concluded that the defendant "possessed a reasonable
expectation of privacy" in his e-mails.17
However, the court recognized that the "type of e-mail involved and the
intended recipient" could limit this reasonable expectation of privacy.38 First,
when someone sends out e-mail, the reasonableness of his or her privacy
expectation begins to decrease. For example, if the message is posted in a chat
room or otherwise transmitted in an open fashion, one cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Also, it is not reasonable to assume that the contents of the
e-mail message will remain private once received by the intended recipient. With
this line of reasoning, the court analogized e-mail to postal mail: Someone who
sends a letter sealed in an envelope can reasonably expect it to remain private
until it is received by the third party, but she bears the risk that the third party
might disclose the letter's contents to the authorities.39 One sending an e-mail
using an AOL account, the court reasoned, does not enjoy a reasonable
expectation to total privacy of the message; reasonable expectations instead are
limited to the belief that "police officials will not intercept the transmission
without probable cause and a search warrant. ' 4°
Other cases have reaffirmed Maxwell's requirement of a warrant for searches
of e-mail. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v.
Monroe4' found that users of a government e-mail system had a reasonable
expectation that law enforcement officers would not intercept their messages even
though there was specific notice that the system administrator was monitoring the
e-mail. 42 Though not confronting the issue directly, other courts have assumed in
the most powerful and safe online experience.... Microsoft and MSN are licensees of the
TRUSTe Privacy Program TRUSTe is an independent, non-profit organization whose
mission is to build trust and confidence in the Intemet .... [Tihis website has agreed... to
have its privacy practices reviewed for compliance by TRUSTe.
Microsoft Network, MSN Hotmail Privacy Statement, at http://www.hotmail.com/help/legal/
privacy.htm (last modified June 2000).
Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417.
38Id. at 418-19.
39 Id. The court also found that the same expectation of privacy existed for telephone calls,
as we expect our conversations to remain private and not be intercepted by the police, but we
bear the risk that the person on the other end of the line will squeal to the police after hanging
up. Id. at 418.
40 Id.
4 52 M.J. 326 (Ct. App. A.F. 2000).
421 Id. at 330. In line with its earlier decision in Maxwell, however, the court held that when
one has notice that the system administrator is monitoring e-mail, there is no reasonable
expectation that the administrator will not turn the e-mail over to the authorities. Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a similar scenario, where an
employee for the CIA was prosecuted after a remote search of his office computer turned up
child pornography. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000). Since he had
been informed that it was agency policy to "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" Interet use by
employees, he enjoyed no reasonable expectation that the agency would not search his
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dicta that users have reasonable expectations of privacy in their e-mail
messages.43
2. Addressing, Routing, and Signaling Information and the Pen
Register Problem
As these cases suggest, it is not unreasonable for someone to assume that
their e-mails will remain private and will not be intercepted by the FBI using
Carnivore without first obtaining a warrant from a neutral magistrate. While this
protection is comforting, the FBI can use Carnivore to keep track of routing and
addressing information of e-mails (incoming and outgoing) and websites visited
by individuals using Carnivore's pen register/trap and trace mode.44 Under
current federal law, not only is a warrant not required for interception of
addressing information, but also the ECPA's provisions regulating pen
register/trap and trace devices are inadequate for protecting Internet users' privacy
interests.
In their traditional use, law enforcement officials utilized pen registers and
trap and trace devices for telephone lines, recording the phone number of all
outgoing and incoming calls made on a suspect's line. Like a telephone tap, a pen
register or trap and trace device requires monitoring of a telephone line, but, as the
Supreme Court has held in Smith v. Maryland, does not require a warrant where
none of the contents of the telephone communication are revealed.45 However,
pen registers and trap and trace devices are governed under the ECPA, where
agents are required to apply for a court order upon a showing that "the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation
being conducted by that agency.
4 6
The same requirements apply to pen register/trap and trace searches of
addressing and routing information using devices like Carnivore.47 Similar to the
computer and turn over the materials to the authorities. Id.
43 See Dunlap v. County of Inyo, Nos. 96-15207, 96-15294, 96-15915, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19249, at *9 (9th Cir. July 23, 1997) ("Cellular telephones and electronic mail are both
technologies of questionable privacy, but we nonetheless reasonably expect privacy in our cell
phones and email [sic] messages."); United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 455 n.9
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (assuming that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
files located in his AOL account).
44 See Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at 3-21 (generally describing test of
Carnivore's e-mail addressing information collection procedures).45 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding the numbers defendant dialed on his phone, as "all phone users
realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company").
46 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (1994).
47 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272 (extending the definition of Pen Register in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)
(1994) to include "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
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pen register, Carnivore can be set to retrieve only information concerning where
an outgoing e-mail was sent, where an incoming e-mail was sent from, and the e-
mail address itself.48 The FBI contends that, consistent with Smith, they can
retrieve this information without need for a warrant.49 Privacy experts have cried
foul, however, contending that an e-mail address reveals much more than a
simple phone number.5 ° Whether the FBI will require a warrant to conduct a pen
register search with Carnivore will depend on whether e-mail users have a
reasonable expectation of privacy not only to the contents of their e-mail but also
to the addressing information. Smith suggests that the FBI does not need a warrant
in order to get the addressing information from someone's e-mail account, and
equally troubling is the fact that the provisions of the ECPA require only minimal
justification for searches of addressing and routing information, even though this
information may reveal considerable details about an individual.
The Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding
by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted."
However, devices which intercept "the contents of any communication" are expressly excluded
from the definition); id. § 216(c)(3) (extending definition of Trap and Trace Device in 18
U.S.C. § 3127(1) (1994) to include "dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided,
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication").41 See Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at 3-2.49 See Kerr, supra note 4.
'o See Kevin Butler, Is Big Brother Surfing the Internet?: FBI's 'Carnivore' Raises
Privacy Issue, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Aug. 9, 2000, at A22 (quoting privacy advocates'
complaints that allowing pen register/trap and trace searches of Internet addressing information
"goes far beyond what the Supreme Court OK'd in 1979 [with the Smith decision]"). Philip L.
Gordon, an attorney at the Privacy Foundation, commented in The Wall Street Journal that
Carnivore's capture of e-mail addressing information is "clearly different" from pen registers.
Ted Bridis, FBI's E-Mail Suggest Divisions On Legality of Web Surveillance, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 7, 2000, at B9. Specifically, experts have commented that "the record of a phone call
placed to a certain number won't necessarily identify the people who talked, but e-mail sent to a
particular address allows police to derive identities with greater precision." Id. Even the FBI's
own internal agents initially questioned the legality of the pen register/e-mail address capture
feature of Carnivore, but the FBI later attributed the division to the "inexperience of some
bureau field offices dealing with the latest technology tools and policy questions they raise." Id.
Critics who are concerned that Carnivore's pen mode will reveal more than just an e-mail
address may be on the right track. The Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute found
that there were cases of "potential over-collection in pen mode." See Steven M. Bellovin et al.,
Comments on the Carnivore System Technical Review, at http://www.crypto.com/papers/
camivorereport_comments.htm] (Dec. 3, 2000). Under some circumstances, even though
Carnivore is programmed only to collect an address, it may actually retrieve an entire packet,
which would contain content. Id. The report also noted that in pen mode, Carnivore could
determine the length of various communications, thus allowing web "traffic analysis" and
identification of the web pages a user was visiting. Id.
Congress has recognized the distinction between telephone numbers and e-mail addresses,
stating that it was "[r]ecogniz[ed] that transactional records from on-line communication
systems reveal more than telephone toll records." S. REP. No. 103-402, at 31 (1994).
1842 [Vol. 62:1831
pen registers in Smith v. Maryland.5' In Smith, the local police had attached a pen
register to the defendant's telephone line to determine whether he had robbed and
subsequently placed threatening calls to a woman. The pen register revealed that
the defendant had indeed called the woman's home, and on that basis the police
obtained a warrant to search his home. The defendant challenged the search
warrant, arguing that the police's use of the pen register was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus required a warrant. Applying the
analysis utilized in Katz, the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone.5 2 In reaching its
decision, the Court was quick to distinguish the pen register used in the case from
the telephone wiretap used in Katz, noting that "pen registers do not acquire the
contents of communications."53 The Court reasoned that the defendant had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone because
"all telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the
telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment
that their calls are completed." 54 Additionally, everyone who utilizes phone
services, according to the Court, realizes that companies keep track of phone
numbers for billing and long distance purposes, as well as to respond to annoying
and obscene calls.55 Furthermore, according to the Court, even if the defendant
did have a valid expectation of privacy, it was not an expectation that society
would view as reasonable, because he "voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. ''5 6
No court has taken the inferential step and applied the Smith rule regarding
the apprehension of telephone numbers to the apprehension of e-mail addresses
through electronic surveillance. However, lower courts, while not explicitly
considering whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
addressing information for their e-mail, have been largely reluctant to consider
anything beyond the content of electronic communications in their Katz
(reasonable expectation of privacy) analysis. For example, in United States v.
Hambrick,57 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly construed the Katz
rule to apply only to the content of e-mails, thus implicitly excluding e-mail
addresses from its protection.58 Hambrick dealt with an Intemet user's expectation
"' 442 U.S. 735 (1979).52 id. at 742.
53 d. at 741.54 Id. at 742.
5 5 1d.56 Id. at 744. The Court cited Katz and other cases for the proposition that "a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Id. at
743-44.57 No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).58 Id. at *11-*12 ("While under certain circumstances, a person may have an expectation
of privacy in content information, a person does not have an interest in account information
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of privacy in the user information submitted to an ISP in the creation of an
Internet account. Like the phone numbers in Smith, the court held that there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information because it (1) did not disclose
the content of any communication, and (2) was voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.59 This decision suggests that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in addressing information, because it does not contain any "content"
communication and is necessarily disclosed by the e-mail user to the ISP upon
sending.
When viewed in isolation, the case law surrounding pen registers and trap
and trace devices gives the appearance that e-mail addressing information will
never be out of reach of Carnivore, for the FBI does not need a warrant in order to
obtain it. Fortunately, Congress responded to concerns stemming from the Smith
decision-that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies would be able to
initiate pen registers without a judicial order-by passing the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986.60 Until Congress initiated
legislation in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was
doubt as to whether the ECPA applied to the retrieval of Internet addressing and
routing information.6' Congress extinguished this doubt with passage of the
given to the ISP [Internet Service Provider] in order to establish the e-mail account, which is
non-content information."); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108-10 (D. Kan.
2000) (holding that the law enforcement's request and receipt of defendant's subscriber
information from an ISP did not violate defendant's constitutional rights as he "has not
demonstrated an objectively reasonable legitimate expectation of privacy in his subscriber
info").
59 See Hambrick, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *7-* 12.
60 See United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (generally
describing how Congress sought to place limits on the government's ability to monitor
electronic communications after the decision in Smith).
61 See Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Analysis of Provisions of the
Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 Affecting the Privacy of Communications and Personal
Information, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/ata analysis.html (Sep. 24, 2001) (noting
that whether the pre-September 1 th wiretap laws allowed the FBI to apply pen register/trap
and trace provisions, which were couched in the language of telephone equipment, to electronic
addressing and routing information "remains an open and debatable question"). For an
illustration of Congress' view, in enacting the ECPA, that pen register/trap and trace devices
applied only to telephone dialing information see the Senate report on the ECPA:
Pen registers are devices that record the telephone numbers to which calls have been
placed from a particular telephone. These capture no part of an actual telephone
conversation, but merely the electronic switching signals that connect two telephones. The
same holds true for trap and trace devices, which record the numbers of telephones from
which calls have been placed to a particular telephone.
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986). But see COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SECTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2001), available at
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ searchmanual.htm (Jan. 2001) (interpreting the ECPA as
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Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, which extended
the ECPA's definition of pen register/trap and trace devices to include technology
intercepting "routing, addressing, and signaling information," but not the content
of electronic communications. 62 Thus, so long as a government attorney presents
an application to a court that "certifi[es] to the court that the information likely to
be obtained ... [by the pen register or trap and trace device] is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation," the judge "shall enter an ex parte order
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or tap and trace device
anywhere in the United States."63 The changes to the pen register/trap and trace
provisions of the ECPA provide considerably more protection to Internet users
by, at a minimum, ensuring that law enforcement officers get a court order before
instituting a pen register/trap and trace search. However, the pen register/trap and
trace provisions exhibit a crucial weakness in that they apply a uniform "relevant
to an ongoing investigation" threshold to addressing, routing, and telephone
numbers, even though addressing and routing information reveal much more
about an individual than does a telephone number.64 The ECPA should ideally
require a stronger showing for the interception of addressing and routing
information as the interception of this data implicates privacy interests not present
in the retrieval of telephone numbers.
According to the Independent Review of Carnivore, Carnivore can operate
under a "pen mode" where it can gather, "TO and FROM e-mail addresses and
the IP addresses65 of computers involved" in file transfer and web browsing
sessions.66 Simply stated, Carnivore can be set to gather lists of the individuals a
computer user has sent e-mail to and received e-mail from, lists of the computers
"permit[ing] law enforcement to obtain the addressing information of Internet e-mails... using
a court order, just like it permits law enforcement to obtain addressing information for phone
calls .. ).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§§ 216(c)(2)-(3), 115 Stat. 272.
63 Id. § 216(b)(1) (emphasis added). This provision not only departs from the previous
version of the statute by extending pen register/trap and trace rules to the interception of
addressing and routing information, but also makes a court order valid nationwide. The ECPA
originally provided that the order was good only "within the jurisdiction of the court." 18
U.S.C. § 3123(a) (1994). It goes without saying that this greatly enhances the Justice
Department's ability to intercept addressing information out of the supervisory guise of the
issuing judge.
6Butler, supra note 50, at A22.
65 Each computer (including an individual's personal computer), website, and e-mail
server has a unique IP address, which is part of the "global addressing system that allows
people to find Web sites, e-mail to get to its intended recipients and computers on the Internet to
communicate at all." Gary Chapman, WHat's in a Web Domain Name? For a System Under
Strain, It Spells Trouble, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at T2.
6 Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at ix.
18452001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
the user has transferred files with, and lists of computers/web-servers accessed by
the user in the course of surfing the Intemet. These types of addressing
information reveal much more than a telephone number does. For instance, an e-
mail address can indicate the specific identity of an individual someone
communicates with, while a telephone number does not necessarily identify the
individual.67 E-mail addresses can also reveal the location, place of employment,
and even the department that someone works in.68
Carnivore's ability to retrieve IP addresses has even greater potential for
gathering personal information. The Carnivore Independent Review indicates
that, while Carnivore can collect the source and destination IP addresses of
computers a user accesses while web surfing or transmitting files, no "URL69 and
content of the target's web activities" are collected.70 However, IP addresses
reveal not only data about how information "transmitted over the network can be
sent to its proper destination"'" but also the websites an individual visits and their
content.7 ' Although Carnivore cannot retrieve website URL addresses during a
pen register/trap and trace search, the FBI can use the information Carnivore
obtains to view the content of websites. For example, intercepted IP addresses can
be entered manually into a web browser to access a web site,73 and once the name
of the website is obtained, the FBI can use the website's URL to gain even more
information about a user.74
67 Bridis, supra note 50, at B9.
68 JACOB PALME, ELECTRONIC MAIL 64 (1995) (describing how e-mails utilize domain
addresses which split the address "into several subfields, department, company, street address,
city, county, country, etc., each narrowing the field of potential recipients further").URL stands for "Universal Resource Locator" and is the address each of us type into a
web browser when seeking to access a website. RICHARD SPINELLO, CYBER ETHics: MORALITY
AND LAW IN CYBERSPACE 154 (2000).
70 Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at 3-22.
71 SPINELLO, supra note 69, at 154.
7' Butler, supra note 50, at A22 (finding that "web addresses reveal not only that you
visited Amazon.com, for example. They could also reveal what books you looked for or
bought"). Other commentators have noted that IP addresses can reveal geographic information
as well. LINCOLN STEIN, WEB SECURITY: A STEP-BY-STEP REFERENCE GUIDE 127 (1998)
(noting that IP addresses can "give the remote site a strong hint of your geographic location or
the company you work for").73 BOB LEVITUs & JEFF EVANS, WEBMASTER WINDOWs: How To BUILD YOUR OWN
WORLD WIDE WEB SERVER WITHOUT REALLY TRYING 37 (2d ed. 1997) (noting how IP
numbers can be entered into web browsers to access websites in lieu of traditional web
addresses). If a court were to find that retrieval of the websites an individual uses amounts to
retrieval of content, then this would take searches of IP addresses out of the Smith v. Maryland
pen register doctrine and into the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, possibly
requiring the use of a warrant. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.74 See John Markoff, Bitter Debate on Privacy Divides Two Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1999, at Cl (explaining that some websites aggregate the Internet navigation patterns of their
visitors to "leam about [the visitors'] shopping behavior" and that, consequently, web page
addresses (URLs) "increasingly contain personal information the sites have gathered").
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Though Carnivore is currently configured only to retrieve e-mail and IP
addresses in "pen mode," the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permits pen
register/trap and trace searches to recover routing information as well. 75 The
interception of routing information poses an added threat to computer users'
privacy interests as this information typically "shows the subject line of a
message. 76 Thus, the FBI would be free to reconfigure Carnivore to conduct
searches for routing information without any additional justification beyond the
"relevant to an ongoing investigation" standard for pen register/trap and trace
searches.
As has been demonstrated, e-mail addresses and IP addresses reveal
considerably more information than phone numbers. However, the pen
register/trap and trace provisions of the ECPA apply the same "relevant to an
ongoing investigation" requirement for the interception of addressing, routing,
and telephone numbers. Because of the greater privacy interests implicated with
addressing and routing information, the ECPA needs to require a stronger
justification from the FBI when it seeks to acquire this information with
Carnivore. Although such a subtle oversight is understandable in light of the
speed at which Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the critical privacy interests at stake
necessitates that Congress carefully reconsider this issue and apply different
requirements for the interception of electronic addressing information.
IV. THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
In addition to requiring warrants to search places (such as e-mail) where
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment requires
search warrants to "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. ' 78 The requirement of particularity in the warrant
75 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 216c)(2)-(3), 115 Stat. 272.
7 Guy Guigliotta & Jonathan Krim, Push for Increased Surveillance Powers Worries
Some, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A4.
77 Proposals for revision of wiretap laws started circulating on Capitol Hill less than two
weeks after the September II terrorist attacks. See John Lancaster & Jonathan Krim, Ashcrofl
Presents Anti-Terrorism Plan to Congress; Lawmakers Promise Swift Action, Disagree on
Extent of Measures, WASH. POST, September 20,2001, at A24. The final version of the Act was
introduced in the House of Representatives on October 23, 2001; was passed by the House on
October 24; was considered in and passed by the Senate on October 25; and was signed into
law by President Bush on October 29. A mere seven days elapsed from the Act's introduction
until its enactment. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 3162 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Legislation &
Politics, U.S. Congress, Congressional Bills & Bill Tracking File).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The requirement of particularity stems from the colonial times,
where general or "rummaging" searches were conducted against colonists by royal revenue
officers. Authorities were allowed with a warrant to enter a premises and search for anything
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prevents the police from entering homes and rummaging through personal effects
in order to fimd incriminating evidence and leaves nothing "to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant." 79 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment has indicated that the value in the particularity requirement lays in
preventing "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another."' Thus,
police officers should have no discretion in choosing what to seize.1 In theory,
this too should provide adequate protection against the FBI's use of Carnivore to
randomly search through e-mail messages. However, courts have not addressed
the issue of particularity with regard to the interception of e-mail, and courts'
lenient treatment of stored electronic communications searches indicate that
agents will be left with much discretion in conducting Carnivore searches.
Additionally, the FBI's intended procedures for operating Carnivore may lead to
overbroad searches that turn up more materials than necessary.
There have been major issues developing with the application of the
particularity requirement to searches of computer data, as incriminating data is
often intermingled with non-incriminating, personal data.82 The Supreme Court
has recognized that there will be situations in which documents (or computer
data) requested in a warrant will be intermingled with non-requested documents,
and that this possibility mandates that law enforcement officials "take care to
assure that [searches] are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted
intrusions upon privacy. 83 Unfortunately, in the context of stored data, many
lower courts have interpreted search warrants requesting search and/or seizure of
computer data to justify the search and/or seizure of all the materials on the
computer regardless of their relevance to the commission of a crime. This has
dramatic implications for Carnivore searches because, depending on how the FBI
uses Carnivore, e-mails and Internet data not related to a crime listed in the
warrant could be retrieved and searched by the FBI. Thus, the FBI could
conceivably be allowed to collect e-mails transmitted from someone's account
and then "rummage" through them to find incriminating materials.
The Tenth Circuit has had numerous occasions to consider whether
authorities may search through multiple documents (including irrelevant ones)
contained in a computer to obtain contraband listed in a warrant. A leading case
on this issue is United States v. Campos,14 where the court upheld the seizure of a
defendant's entire computer system for purposes of locating images of child
that might be contraband. Under the particularity requirement, however, authorities must know
what they are searching for before conducting the search and not after. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886).
79 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
go Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
81 id.
82 See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.
J. L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994).
83 Id. (citing Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,482 n. I (1976)).
' 221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000).
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pornography. The defendant argued that search of his entire computer for
pornography would constitute a "general search" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.85 However, the court concluded that because the warrant authorized
a focused search that looked only for "items relating to child pornography,"
search of the entire computer's contents was justified. 6 The court noted,
however, that there are limitations on the authorities' ability to search through
computer data, especially where the computer documents are so "intermingled"
as to require "a more particularized inquiry.,87 The court then relied on its
decision in United States v. Carey,88 where it adopted the requirement that where
documents are "so intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot
feasibly be sorted at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending
approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a further search
through the documents.' 89
The requirement of magistrate intervention in cases of "intermingled
documents" was adopted from the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Tamura.90 In that case, the court found that the FBI had exercised too much
discretion in a search of a corporation during a criminal investigation. 9' The
warrant issued by the FBI authorized seizure of three specific types of documents;
however, when the FBI agents discovered that it would take a long time to search
through all of the documents, they requested that the company assist them in
retrieving the documents. 92 The company refused to cooperate, and the FBI
"seized 11 cardboard boxes of computer printouts, which were bound in 2000-
page volumes; 34 file drawers of vouchers, also bound in 2 000-page volumes;
and 17 drawers of cancelled checks, which were bundled into files., 93 A
significant portion of these records contained data not relevant to the crimes
851d. at 1146.
16 Id. at 1147. The court noted that:
Computer storage devices... can store the equivalent of thousands of pages of
information. Especially when the user wants to conceal criminal evidence, he often stores
it in random order with deceptive file names. This requires searching authorities to
examine all the stored data to determine whether it is included in the warrant.
Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 1148.
88 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). Carey similarly dealt with a search of a computer
system for contraband specified in a warrant. The warrant authorized a search for information
relating to illegal drugs, but upon inspection of the computer, officers turned up child
pornography. Analogizing a search of multiple computer files to be similar to searching for
"intermingled documents" in a file cabinet, the court adopted procedures used by the Ninth
Circuit in Tamura v. United States, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). Id. at 1271.89 Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148 (citing Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275).
9 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
91 Id. at 594.
92 id.
9' Id. at 594-95.
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alleged in the warrant.94 The court found that this type of "wholesale
seizure ... [was] 'the kind of investigatory dragnet that the fourth amendment
was designed to prevent."' 95
The FBI justified its seizure and subsequent search of the documents on the
grounds that the documents described in the warrant were intermingled with non-
relevant documents, which made sorting difficult.96 The court rejected this
argument and held that where documents requested in a warrant are intermingled
with irrelevant documents, "[t]he essential safeguard required is that wholesale
removal must be monitored by the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate." 97
The requirement of magistrate intervention in the case of intermingled
documents and computer files is an important step in ensuring that the FBI and
other agencies do not have the authority to search through irrelevant, private
documents when looking for materials as required in a warrant. However, though
the court ultimately found that the government had exceeded the scope of the
warrant, it refused to suppress any evidence obtained from the search. The court
found that all the documents, which were eventually used in the case against the
defendant, were lawful, because they had been "described in and therefore taken
pursuant to the valid search warrant."98 This is a crucial weakness of the decision,
as it does not provide an adequate penalty (i.e., suppression of all the evidence
that the FBI would have used in the case) to discourage law enforcement officials
from reading through irrelevant, personal material when conducting a search.
Another critical weakness of the Tamura decision is that a large number of
courts have simply refused to apply it to situations involving computer data. In
United States v. Scott-Emuakpor,99 the District Court for the Western District of
Michigan upheld a warrant that provided for the seizure of "records, including
computer files" related to the violation of immigration laws. The defendant
argued that the files to be searched on the computer needed to be specified with
more particularity, in order to avoid a general search through all of his private
files.'00 The court, however, found that "in searching for such files, the agents had
no way of knowing whether they would be found on computer hard drives or on
94 id.95 Id. (quoting United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1980)).
% Id.
971d. at 596. The court suggested that law enforcement officers can avoid violations of
suspects' Fourth Amendment rights by utilizing the procedures in the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. These procedures require officials to impound
intermingled documents and inform the magistrate who initially issued the original warrant.
The magistrate must then hold a hearing to allow any persons with an interest in the documents
to move to have the documents returned or for "specification of such conditions and limitations
on the further search for the documents to be seized as may be appropriate to prevent
unnecessary or unreasonable invasion of privacy." Id. at 596 n.3.
98 Id. at 596.
99 99-CR-138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2000).
'00 Id. at *16.
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zip disks; nor did they know the format in which those files might be stored.
Thus, the agents could not determine where those files were located without
searching the files on both the hard drives and the zip disks."' 0 ' Refusing to
follow the decision in Tamura, the court distinguished it from the present case by
reasoning that "Tamura did not involve computer files and therefore did not
consider the specific problems associated with conducting a search for
computerized records."'0 2 Ultimately, however, the court did suppress irrelevant
information that exceeded the scope of the warrant, but it did not suppress all of
the documents seized because the defendant had not demonstrated that the
officers had a "flagrant disregard" for the search warrant's limits.0 3
The District Court for the Northern District of New York noted similar
concerns with the seizing of computer data when it upheld a search of an America
Online user's stored e-mails for evidence of pornography. 0 4 The court noted that
while the language of the warrant' 0 5 did not limit investigators to seizing only
files containing images of child pornography, the FBI agents could not determine
whether there was child pornography without seizing and searching all of the
files.' 0 6 Thus, it was not unreasonable to allow the FBI to take the data from the
AOL accounts back to an FBI lab and search through the data for the
incriminating materials specified in the warrant.'0°
'o' Id. at *17.
"o2 Id. The court'i decision is ultimately flawed, however, in reasoning that the search of
computer files presents additional difficulties not present with the search of paper files. Both
ultimately involve the same procedures, namely the search of the content of documents. Paper
files, just like computer files, can be difficult to find and require sorting through irrelevant
documents to get to the ones specified in the warrant. There would appear to be no reason why
computer files should not be treated like "intermingled documents" in Tamura and require the
intervention of a magistrate to ensure that privacy rights are not being unnecessarily trammeled.
In fact, the danger of invasion of privacy is arguably greater with computers, as their storage
capacity could potentially subject many times more private documents to the FBI's prying eyes
under the Scott-Emuakpor rule.
o3 Id. at *25.
104 United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
'05 See id. at 458 (describing warrant as containing the broad statement seeking "all stored
files in original format in individual files" in the defendant's account).
106 See id. at 459 ("In these circumstances it is unreasonable to require the executing
officers to identify which files actually contain child pomography and which do not in AOL's
Virginia headquarters. That task may be more properly performed by a government computer
technician at an FBI lab or office.").
107 Id. Other cases have similarly held that authorities can search all the files contained in a
computer for contraband. See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that while the warrants described computer equipment in generic terms and "subjected it to
blanket seizure ... this type of generic classification is acceptable 'when a more precise
description is not possible."' A customs agent had stated that "there was no way to specify what
hardware and software had to be seized to retrieve the images accurately."); see also United
States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding warrant authorizing search of
contents of computer, the court cited Lacy and found that Tamura could not apply in this case
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The implications of these cases for the FBI's use of Carnivore are great.
Despite the Fourth Amendment's requirement of particularity in searches, the FBI
could conceivably conduct overbroad searches with Carnivore without any
penalty from the courts. Thus, if the FBI specified in a warrant that it was seeking
e-mails related to terrorist bombings, it could, either purposely or by a
malfunction of Carnivore,'0 8 expand Carnivore's search criteria, intercept a wide-
range of e-mails, and weed through the e-mails to determine which ones
contained incriminating evidence. A broader search would be especially useful to
the FBI where the search criteria may not reveal all of the desired information.'09
If a search turned up evidence of other crimes, that evidence would be
suppressed, but other evidence relevant to the warrant would not be suppressed. "0
This gives the FBI little incentive to avoid overbroad searches and reduce
unnecessary infringement into our privacy.
Aside from a court-imposed suppression incentive, the FBI's operating
procedures as described in the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute's
evaluation of Carnivore do not provide much assurance that the FBI agents using
Carnivore will not employ overly broad search terms. Though a court order for an
intercept with Carnivore must state "a particular description of the type of
communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense
to which it relates," there is no judicial oversight of the search terms used to
intercept e-mails."' After FBI agents obtain a warrant or an intercept order, they
are free to exercise discretion in determining the search criteria to be used- for
retrieval of e-mail.
The only other form of oversight as to the particularity of the search criteria is
the FBI's internal minimization procedures. 12 The first minimization technique is
entering search criteria into Carnivore to ensure that only relevant e-mails are
because the government "had no way of knowing where the images were stored"); United
States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that search warrants were
sufficiently particular as they contained phrases limiting the scope of the search to documents
and data containing child pornography).
'0' The comments on the Carnivore System Technical Review indicated that the Research
Institute's tests of Carnivore lacked "analysis of operational and 'systems' issues, including
interactions between the Carnivore code and its host environment and operating system. Many
potential security flaws and collection errors are likely to be found in this area" (emphasis
added). Bellovin et al., supra note 50. This observation tends to indicate that it is unclear
whether or not a Carnivore search would intercept more information than requested. See id.
'09 This is similar to the situation that confronts us all when we use search engines on the
Internet. Sometimes the search criteria do not yield enough information, thus necessitating the
use of broader search criteria to retrieve more materials.
"
0 See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Scott-Emuakpor, 99-CR-138, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3118, at *25 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2000)
(suppressing evidence obtained outside of the scope of the warrant, but refusing to suppress
evidence relevant to the warrant).
Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at 3-1.
"Id. at 3-4.
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intercepted. 1 3 This technique can be effective, assuming that Carnivore's
interceptions do not turn up more information than requested. The Carnivore
Independent Review concluded that "when Carnivore is used [correctly under a
court] order, it provides investigators with no more information than is permitted
by a given court order."' 14 The report reviewing the findings of the Carnivore
Independent Review, however, noted many flaws in the analysis of Carnivore's
operation, which leave it far from clear as to whether Carnivore collects more
information than necessary.' 15 Specifically, the report noted that under a heavy
collection load, Carnivore may not accurately collect data, and in pen mode (a
mode where only addressing and signaling information are collected), there is the
possibility that Carnivore may collect more packets than authorized. 1 6 The
second minimization technique is used when FBI agents examine the collected e-
mail packets with the special software designed to assemble the packets into
whole e-mails. At that point, it is FBI policy for the agent to "determine[ ] which
information is relevant and which is not.""' Again, the FBI is left to its own
devices to search for contraband through all of the intercepted material, even
though it is not relevant to the search warrant. Taken together, the courts' inability
to effectively apply the particularity requirement to searches of computer data and
the lack of oversight over the FBI's use of search criteria when using Carnivore
may allow the FBI to conduct overbroad searches of intercepted material,
regardless of whether this material is relevant to a search warrant, thus
constituting a significant intrusion into the privacy of individuals being searched.
V. CONGRESS STEPS IN: TITLE III AND THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
A. Background
The requirement of a warrant for interception of telephone and electronic
communications is somewhat comforting, but Congress has repeatedly stepped
into the picture to allow interception only "under carefully subscribed
circumstances."' 18 In response to the Supreme Court's decisions in Katz and
Berger," 9 Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (hereinafter Title 111).2 ° This legislation imposed substantial restrictions on
113 1d.
114 Id. at xii.
"
5 See Bellovin et al., supra note 50.
116Id.
117Id.
.. S. REP. No. 99-541, at2 (1986).119 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending Fourth Amendment protection
to electronic interception of conversations); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (same).
120 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986).18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (1994) were first passed as Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.
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law enforcement's ability to intercept wire and oral communications. Title HI
largely continued in the same form until 1986, when Congress passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (hereinafter ECPA) to extend protection
to "electronic communications,''12 including electronic mail.' 2 2 Though Title III
as amended by the ECPA does provide some protection over intercepts of e-mail,
the protections don't go nearly far enough to prevent abuse of Carnivore by the
FBI. Title Ill's provisions for judicial supervision of the intercept process are
inadequate to deal with the complexities of a search utilizing Carnivore.
Additionally, as applied, Title IlI's requirement that the FBI minimize retrieval of
unnecessary information has been broadly interpreted by the courts to allow a
wide range of intrusive conduct.2 3 Most glaringly, however, is Title 1ll's lack of a
suppression remedy to discourage FBI conduct in violation of its provisions.
1. Requirements of the ECPA
In order for an agency like the FBI to conduct an interception of e-mail with
Carnivore, Title II as amended by the ECPA requires application for a wiretap
order from a "Federal judge of competent jurisdiction"' 24 supported by "probable
cause."'125 The FBI can only make an application for a wire, oral, or electronic
intercept pursuant to investigations of certain enumerated crimes.' 26 A higher-
121 As amended by the ECPA, Title I1 § 2510 defines "electronic communication" as
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include-(A)
any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117
of this title); or (D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in
a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (Supp. V 1999).
.22 Id. The Senate report indicates that Congress believed that the 1968 Act had become
"hopelessly out of date" and had "not kept pace with the development of communications and
computer technology." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986).
123 See James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 77 (1997) (finding
that "the minimization requirement.., has not been strictly enforced by the judiciary").
124 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. V 1999).
12' See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (1994) (requiring, inter alia, "probable cause for belief
that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense... [and] probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that
offense will be obtained through such interception").
116 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)-(e) (1994 and Supp. V 1999) (enumerating specific crimes for
which interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications can be made, including sabotage
of nuclear facilities or fuel; espionage; sabotage; piracy, offenses involving "murder,
kidnapping, robbery, or extortion"; bribery, obstruction of criminal investigations;
counterfeiting; and drug trafficking). The requirements for interception of electronic
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level Justice Department official 27 must approve the application to the judge, and
the judge may only grant the wiretap order if, based on the facts submitted by the
applicant, there is a showing that probable cause exists and that "normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to
be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."' 128 The application also
must include a provision that the intercept will be conducted "as soon as
practicable" and that it will be "conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception" of irrelevant conversations.1
29
Title II also provides for limited judicial supervision to ensure that the
interception is not taking too long, that the investigators are taking proper steps to
minimize the interception of irrelevant conversations, and that the intercept is not
proceeding beyond the bounds of the wiretap order. 30 Finally, the statute also
provides for criminal and civil penalties for violation of its terms and for
suppression of evidence received from unlawful oral and wire intercepts (but not
electronic communications).' 3'
communications, however, are more relaxed, and any federal felony will suffice to justify an
application. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(3) (1994).
17See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any
acting Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General or acting Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney
General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge" for an order that authorizes
intercetion of wire or oral communications).
12 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a)-(d) (1994). Title m sets out the formal requirements of the
application, requiring it to include, among others:
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and
the officer authorizing the application; (b) a full and complete statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be
issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been... committed... (iii)
a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the
identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted; (c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed ... (d) a statement of the period of time for which
the interception is required to be maintained ....
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1994).
29 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994).
"0 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1994) (providing that an order authorizing an intercept "may
require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order showing what progress had been
made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception.
Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require.") (emphasis added).
1 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1994) (authorizing criminal penalties for unlawful interception
and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1994)
(providing for suppression); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1994) (authorizing civil damages for violations).
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B. Judicial Supervision and the ECPA
At the outset, it should be noted that many of the ECPA's shortcomings are
due to the lack of judicial supervision over the intercept process. This lack of
supervision makes it difficult for judges to adequately ascertain whether the FBI
is properly minimizing its collection of communications, whether other
investigative techniques could be utilized before resorting to an electronic
intercept, or whether the surveillance itself is even necessary.132 In its report
evaluating Carnivore, the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute states
that "[j]udges are involved in the Carnivore process throughout." '33 After issuing
the order, according to the Carnivore Report, "the court often spot-checks
minimization [and] ensures that the interception does not continue longer than is
necessary."' 134 While Title M does provide for progress reports to monitor
minimization and the length of intercepts, the scope of the reporting provision
does not provide for effective judicial supervision. 35 This is highlighted by the
fact that the statutory language implementing progress reports is permissive in
tone, and the judge's determination of the adequacy of reports is dependent
entirely on the assertions of the officials filling out the reports.
The primary instrument for judicial supervision of electronic intercepts
resides in section 2518(6) of Title IMI, which states that "[w]henever an order
authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may require
reports to be made to the judge who issued the order showing what progress has
been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for
continued interception."' 136 Thus, judicial supervision is not even required for
intercept orders, and appellate courts as a rule do not review the adequacy of
progress reports or suppress evidence for failure of a judge to require progress
reports. 37 Though most federal judges typically insist on reports issued at five-
132 See 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN AND ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING 13-5 (2d ed. 1995) (citing S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112) ("Congress intended the progress report provision to provide a judicial
'check on the continuing need to conduct surveillance. At any time that the judge is convinced
the need is no longer established, he or she may order the surveillance discontinued."').
131 See Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at 3-6.
134 id.
135The FBI was more realistic about Title Ill's provisions regarding supervision in
statements made before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution,
noting that "[j]udges may, and usually do, require periodic reports to the court.., advising it of
the progress of the interception effort." See Donald M. Kerr, Statement for the Record of
Donald M Kerr, Assistant Director, Laboratory Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on
Internet and Data Interception Capabilities Developed by FBI Before the United States House
of Representatives, The Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Washington, D.C., at http://www.fbi.gov/ congress/congressOO/kerr072400.htm (July 24,
2000).
136 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1994) (emphasis added).
137 See FISHMA & MCKENNA, supra note 132, at 13-6 (citing United States v. Scafidi,
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day intervals, state judges are less likely to require them.'38 Additionally, even if a
judge requires a report, courts have "declined to impose sanctions when reports
are submitted late or are not submitted at all."' 39 The National Wiretap
Commission, convened in 1976 to explore the abuses of traditional telephone
taps, concluded:
[U]nfortunately, "the protections to be enforced by the judiciary are often
illusory."... Some courts have relied upon the issuing judge's supervision of
monitoring to uphold total interception of all conversations even though the
issuing judge was unaware that this practice was being followed. In such
situations, judicial "supervision" may constitute little more than uninformed
judicial ratification of improper conduct.140
The First Circuit's decision in United States v. Charles14 1 illustrates the
unwillingness of appellate courts to fault the judge's supervision of a wiretap,
even when it is clearly insufficient to adequately ascertain whether the wiretap is
being conducted properly. The court characterized as "pervasive" a judge's
supervision of a wiretap based on the fact that: (1) the judge had reviewed the
application for a wiretap supported by a fifty page affidavit by the police officer
conducting the investigation; (2) the judge amended the wiretap order to include a
minimization requirement after "carefully review[ing]" the wiretap application;
and (3) the judge initially limited the wiretap to fifteen days. 42 Thus, according to
the court, the supervision was sufficient even though there was no monitoring of
the wiretap process beyond the initial application process. 143
Even where a judge requires reports, they are usually insufficient to provide
adequate supervision over the intercept activities. In United States v. King, the
district court found that judicial supervision was sufficient where the report
summarized the contents of the pertinent calls intercepted, as well as the number
of calls intercepted, and the calls that were subjected to minimization
procedures.' 44 However, the investigating officers make such a report, thus the
judge is forced to view the sufficiency of the wiretap procedures from the
perspective of the law enforcement officers and not as a neutral observer. The
564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977)).
'
31 See id. at 13-7 (citing NAT'L WIRETAP COMM'N REP. 96-97 (1976)).
'
39 Id. at 13-6 (citing United States v. Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841, 847 (N.D. Ala. 1975)).
40Id. at 13-7 (citing HERMAN SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 23
(1977)).
14' 213 F.3d 10, 23 (lst Cir. 2000).
142 id.
143 See id.
' 991 F. Supp. 77, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding sufficient supervision where prosecutor
and court supervised wiretaps through submission of ten-day reports to the court which "not
only contain[ed] summaries of certain pertinent calls, but also detail[ed] the total calls
intercepted ... the number of calls actually completed, the number of calls over two minutes in
length, and the number of calls minimized").
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total dependence on police assertions in the reports raises a real possibility of
police fabrication of reports. Because the only evidence as to the procedures
followed for wiretaps would be in the hands of the law enforcement officials, this
leaves criminal defendants with little or no chance to disprove the report's
contents. 45
The requirements of Title I thus make clear that, during a Carnivore search,
there would be no judicial supervision of Carnivore to ensure that the FBI was
complying with the intercept order. Even if the FBI was required to submit
reports to the judge issuing the wiretap order, the judge would be totally
dependent on the FBI's assertions in the report, making it easy for intercepts to
simply not be reported or for the reports to be falsified. Also, proving that the FBI
falsified or made misrepresentations on the report would be difficult, if not
impossible. If a misrepresentation on a report was proven, some courts may be
unable to offer any remedies. 46 Without adequate judicial supervision of
Carnivore searches, there would be no assurance that the FBI has a continuing
need to conduct a surveillance, or that they are using sufficient minimization
procedures 47 to prevent over-collection of non-pertinent e-mails.
C. The Minimization Requirement
Another protection of Title ImI is the requirement that any intercepts of oral,
wire, or electronic communications be minimized 148 in order to prevent
145 Indeed, for the applications for wiretap orders (as opposed to the progress reports), the
defendant bears a heavy burden of showing that the law enforcement officer's assertions in the
initial application were falsified. See United States v. Crozzoli, 698 F. Supp. 430, 435
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). The defendant would have
to "make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was knowingly and
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth made in the affidavit and that the
statement was necessary to a finding of probable cause" in order to obtain a hearing on a matter.
Id. This case suggests that a defendant would bear a similar heavy burden to prove that an
officer's assertions in a progress report are false. See also United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.
Supp. 345, 358 n.5 (N.D. 11. 1982) (doubting whether it possessed authority to review progress
reports and finding it "difficult if not impossible to determine whether misrepresentations
in ... reports are material," as they are not required under Title III); United States v. Harvey,
560 F. Supp. 1040, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (finding that defendant failed to prove that progress
reports were falsified).
146 See Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. at 358 n.5.
141 See infra Part V.C. (describing minimization requirement).
148 Minimization generally refers to law enforcement techniques used at the time of
interception to limit the number of non-pertinent communications that are intercepted. There are
many different types of minimization procedures that have been approved by the courts.
FIsHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 132, at 14-5. One method is "intrinsic minimization," where
law enforcement officials attempt to screen out non-pertinent material on the fly as the call is
being intercepted. Id. Officers can accomplish this form of minimization by either (1)
discontinuing monitoring of the call or (2) merely discontinuing the recording of the call. Id. at
14-5 to -6. Another method is "extrinsic minimization," which is accomplished by limiting
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unnecessary intrusion on the privacy of individuals and ensure that
communications seized are the ones stipulated in the court order.1 49 As with other
provisions of Title II and the ECPA, court interpretations of the minimization
requirement have given law enforcement a great deal of leeway in determining
what constitutes sufficient justification for not following minimization
procedures. These interpretations open up the possibility that the FBI could use
Carnivore to retrieve information unrelated to an investigation and unnecessarily
intrude on individuals' privacy.
1. Scott v. United States
The Supreme Court established the standard for determining whether the
minimization requirements of Title III were followed in Scott v. United States.'50
In Scott, the Court considered a challenge to a wiretap order issued pursuant to a
narcotics conspiracy on the ground that the federal agents "failed to comply with
the minimization requirement" in the order.' Emphasizing that the Fourth
Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches, the Court found that a
determination as to whether proper minimization techniques were used depends
on an objective "reasonableness" examination of the actions of the investigating
officers in light of the circumstances surrounding the investigation. 52
Factors that should be taken into account in determining the reasonableness
of the minimization procedures include the circumstances surrounding the phone
call and the circumstances surrounding the wiretap itself.. 3 With respect to the
circumstances surrounding the phone call, the Court found that the failure of
investigators to use minimization techniques is justified in the case of short phone
conversations, "one-time only calls," and "ambiguous" or "coded"
conversations. 5 4 According to the Court, in these instances, the agents "can
hardly be expected to know that the calls are not pertinent prior to their
monitoring to short periods of time (i.e., fifteen days as opposed to the statutory ceiling of thirty
days). Id. at 14-6. "Dual recorder minimization" occurs when agents use two tape recorders to
record conversations. For the first tape recording, agents make a "good-faith" effort to stop
recording and listening when non-pertinent material comes up. Id. at 14-7. The second tape
recording is made silently and is never reviewed, as it is only used to "rebut" any claim in court
that minimization techniques were not used. Id. at 14-7. The final method utilized is "after the
fact minimization," where entire conversations are recorded, but only pertinent portions are
transcribed or re-recorded, while the remaining materials are sealed. Id. at 14-7 to -8.
149 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994) (outlining requirement of minimization); United States
v. Clemente, 482 F. Supp. 102, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining that the purpose of
minimization requirement is to prevent unnecessary intrusion on privacy); Dempsey, supra note
123, at 76.
150 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
'l Id. at 132.
..2 Id. at 135-38.





termination."' 55 The circumstances of the wiretap may also justify the non-use of
minimization techniques. In the case of a conspiracy investigation, additional
monitoring may be necessary to "determine the precise scope of the
enterprise."' 56 Also, during the initial phases of the investigation, the law
enforcement officers may be justified in extensive monitoring in order to
determine which types or categories of calls are non-pertinent and will not be
intercepted in the future.157
Utilizing these factors, the Court then proceeded to reject the petitioner's
claim that proper minimization techniques were not used. Though only forty
percent of the calls were pertinent to the investigation, the Court found that the
non-pertinent calls were short in duration, including calls to wrong numbers, calls
where the other party did not answer, and "calls to the telephone company to hear
the recorded weather message.'' 58 Additionally, the Court seized upon the fact
that the investigation involved "a wide-ranging conspiracy."'' 9 Because of the
many participants in the conspiracy, the Court concluded that even the most
experienced officer would have difficulty determining the relevance of the
calls.160 Many of the calls were also what the Court deemed to be "one-time"
calls: "Since these calls did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a
category of innocent calls which should not have been intercepted, their
interception cannot be viewed as a violation of the minimization requirement.' 6'
2. Minimization After Scott
The Court's determination of what factors constitute "reasonableness" for the
purposes of minimization requirements has been applied by lower courts to justify
a variety of broad searches. 162 Most troubling has been lower courts' tendency to
follow Scott's directive that it is appropriate to listen to phone conversations
without minimization to ascertain patterns of innocent calls for future
"minimization."' 63 One example of courts' willingness to allow extensive
155 Id.
156 id.
157 Id. at 141.
... Id. at 141-42.
5 9 Id. at 142.
160 id.
161 id.
162 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 132, at 14-3. The authors state that while they
recognize that many wiretaps involve complex investigations making determinations of
relevance difficult, "some courts have been too willing to cite [the Scott] factors to excuse a
failure to minimize without analyzing whether these factors were actually present to such an
extent that minimization was completely impossible." Id.
163 Id. at 14-13 (noting that "the practice of initial, total interception has a tendency to
become self-perpetuating and self-justifying, and the minimization requirement has sometimes
received little more than lip service"); see United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874 (7th
Cir. 1975) (finding initial monitoring of calls to determine pattern of innocent conduct to be
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monitoring without minimization occurred in United States v. Cleveland.'"A Like
Scott, Cleveland involved a criminal defendant's challenge to a wiretap on
minimization grounds. The court found an initial interception of 89.7% (pertinent
and non-pertinent calls included) of the defendant's calls to be reasonable. The
high percentage of interception was justified on the grounds that the government
needed to listen to non-pertinent calls to determine the "identities of the suspected
co-conspirators."'16
5
Another result of the Scott decision is that courts have been willing to require
no minimization for calls shorter than three minutes in duration. Thus, regardless
of the pertinence of the calls, investigators are permitted to listen to and record all
of the conversations resulting from the intercept. The Cleveland court determined
that the minimization was reasonable after excluding all calls shorter than three
minutes. 66 Other courts have been more restrictive, requiring calls to be under
two minutes to be excused from the minimization requirement.'67 Scott has also
resulted in a series of cases allowing investigators to listen to entire conversations
because of the presence of "drug jargon." In United States v. Williams, 68 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "more extensive wiretapping" is
reasonable anytime agents "reasonably could have believed [that the intercepted
conversations were] coded language referring to possible cocaine transactions."169
The result of these interpretations of the minimization requirement is that
authorities can lawfully intercept a significant amount of irrelevant conversations.
This constitutes a significant invasion of privacy rights and has serious
implications to any e-mail users whose messages may fall prey to Carnivore's
bite. 7° When applied to e-mail interceptions, judges and counsel may be left
"reasonable").164 964 F. Supp. 1073, 1094 n.10 (E.D. La. 1997).
165 Id. The court further reassured itself of the reasonableness of the intercept after
considering the fact that, not including calls under three minutes in length and incomplete calls,
67% of the non-pertinent calls were subject to minimization procedures. Id. at 1094-95. Of
course, this still meant that one-third of non-pertinent calls were being fully listened to by the
investigators.
16 Id. at 1094.
167 United States v. Pichardo, 97 Cr. 233, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13111, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 1999) (citing United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974)).
168 109 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1997).
169 Id. at 507.
170 The FBI argues that Carnivore was developed for the very purpose of minimizing non-
pertinent e-mail interceptions. See Kerr, supra note 4. By allowing FBI agents to enter search
terms relating only to the crime investigated, e-mails not pertaining to the crime will be left
alone. Id. The problem with this is twofold. First, Carnivore has exhibited the potential to over-
collect e-mail in test runs. See supra notes 50, 108. Second, the FBI has sole discretion to
determine the search criteria used in conducting Carnivore searches. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. This, coupled with the fact that the actual Carnivore searches are
unsupervised by the judiciary, can lead to collection of non-pertinent documents. See supra
notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
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scratching their heads and wondering what exactly will constitute "reasonable"
minimization procedures. For example, does the two or three minute exception to
the minimization requirement mean that FBI agents intercepting e-mails with
Carnivore have free reign over short messages? If FBI agents can intercept e-
mails in less than two minutes using Carnivore, are minimization requirements
unnecessary? Under the drug jargon exception to the minimization requirement, it
is conceivable that FBI agents could enter broad search criteria into Carnivore to
pull up more e-mails, because the messages may be "ambiguous in nature or
apparently involv[e] guarded or coded language."17' Worse yet, under the Scott
interpretation, full-blown searches of all of someone's e-mail with Carnivore
might be justified as necessary "to establish categories of non-pertinent [e-mails]
which will not be intercepted thereafter."'
' 72
In enacting the ECPA, Congress recognized that e-mail intercepts would
require different procedures for minimization as "[i]t is impossible to 'listen' to a
computer and determine when to stop listening and minimize as it is possible to
do in listening to a telephone conversation.' ' 173 The committee contemplated that
minimization should be conducted by an initial investigator, who would delete all
non-pertinent information before giving pertinent information to other
investigators. 74 However, no federal court has considered the applicability of
minimization procedures to the interception of e-mail, and whether the
committee's proposed solution would be sufficient is uncertain. It must be noted
that allowing an FBI agent to initially view all of the intercepted e-mails would
not solve the problem of inadequate judicial supervision over the Carnivore
search. Further, the congressional solution does not address the issue of whether
some intercepts of e-mails presumptively do not require minimization, like the
three-minute phone calls or initial intercepts. Thus, there are serious gaps in Title
mi's protections that Carnivore is poised to exploit and that will necessitate some
form of legislative remedy to protect e-mail privacy.
D. Electronic Communications = No Suppression
The most glaring weakness in Title III and the ECPA's provisions is their
failure to provide criminal defendants with a suppression remedy for the FBI's
interception of electronic communications in violation of the statute. In any court
proceeding, an "aggrieved person... may move to suppress the contents of any
wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence
derived therefrom ..... 75 Nowhere in this section is there any mention of the
171 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
"
2 Id. at 141.
173 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 132, at 14-38 to -39 (citing S. REP. No. 99-541, at
31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585).
17 4 Id. at 14-39.
175 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1994).
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suppression of electronic communications. This omission on the part of Congress
in enacting the ECPA was not accidental, as a suppression provision in an earlier
version of the bill faced opposition from the Reagan Administration.17 6 If a
defendant wishes to suppress information obtained from an intercept conducted
by Carnivore, the only remedies available are civil damages under the ECPA or
suppression under the stricter constitutional standard. 17 7 The result is that the FBI
is left without any real incentive to avoid sweeping Carnivore searches in
violation of the ECPA. As Michael Leib notes, the lack of a statutory suppression
rule "creates a situation in which law enforcement officials can be less vigilant in
their application of [Title I1] when electronic communication is involved."' 78
Moreover, the lack of a suppression remedy is in conflict with Title Ill's purpose
of discouraging "unlawful interception of wire and oral communication." 179
According to Leib, the same policy goal applies here, as "[u]sers of electronic
communication have an interest in ensuring that the government be as diligent in
applying the provisions of Title I when intercepting e-mail as when intercepting
wire and oral communication."'
80
VI. LIKE A KID WITH A KEY TO UNLOCK ALL OF THE CANDY STORES: CAN
WE TRUST THE FBI WITH CARNIVORE?
Under the existing statutory and constitutional framework that this note has
described, a variety of searches that the FBI can conduct with Carnivore are
entirely legal. However, the examination of the constitutional and statutory
ramifications has assumed that the FBI will use Carnivore as it says it will. In
Donald Kerr's statement to Congress regarding Carnivore's use, he states that
"[i]n obedience of the law, the FBI obtains judicial authorization, in terms of
always obtaining the appropriate court order required when intercepting wire and
electronic communications' content or when acquiring addressing information
and transactional record information.. . ."'s" But questions remain as to whether
the FBI will use Carnivore legally and whether there is enough external
supervision and internal restraint to prevent the FBI from searching our e-mail
1' See Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add
Electronic Communication to Title III's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a
"Good Faith "Exception, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 410 (1997).
177 United States v. Wells, IP 99-140-CR-B/F-02, 03, 06, 07, 09, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12480, at *17 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 29,2000) (citing S. REP. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986)) ("In the event
that there is a violation of law of a constitutional magnitude, the court involved in a subsequent
trial will apply the existing Constitutional [sic] law with respect to the exclusionary rule."); see
United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting the absence of a
suppression remedy for electronic communication interceptions under the ECPA).
17' Leib, supra note 176, at 418.
179 Id.
180 Id.
1 Kerr, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
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whenever it pleases.
One troubling scenario for Carnivore's abuse might be if the FBI uses it to
"snoop" in order to discover whether users of e-mail are engaging in criminal or
seemingly subversive activity. An FBI agent, under no supervision by any court
or neutral third party, could conceivably enter broad search terms into Carnivore
and intercept thousands of private e-mails. While the FBI claims that any
evidence obtained through an illegal use of Carnivore would be suppressed in a
court of law,'82 there is no judicial oversight preventing the FBI from using this
evidence to seek out new leads in an investigation. 8 3 In the ensuing investigation,
the FBI could then obtain judicial authorization for subsequent invasions of
privacy.
This scenario is not far fetched, as it was suggested in a defendant's challenge
to a court-ordered search of his computer system in United States v. Kennedy.'
84
In Kennedy, the defendant was indicted for intentional receipt of child
pomography."'8 The defendant had an account with a local Road Runner ISP,
which he was using to download pictures.186 Officials at the Road Runner
headquarters received an anonymous call stating that the caller was at a friend's
house and was using his Road Runner access to search through files located on
the defendant's computer.8 7 The officials at Road Runner searched the
defendant's computer from a remote location, verified the caller's tip, and
contacted the FBI.V 8 Using this information, the FBI then executed a warrant to
retrieve the defendant's account information and search defendant's home.8 9 In a
subsequent hearing, the defendant claimed that the evidence should be suppressed
because it was obtained without a warrant.' ° Specifically, he claimed that the
search performed by the anonymous caller was by a government actor and
therefore required a warrant.' 9' Because the defendant did not establish that the
anonymous caller was a government agent, 192 the court rejected the defendant's
claim, noting that the "Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
182 id.
'13 The FBI's assertion that any evidence obtained in violation of the ECPA would be
suppressed is suspect, as the provisions of the ECPA do not have an exclusionary remedy for
violation of its provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994); see United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp.
2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (concluding that even if information was turned over to
authorities pursuant to an inadequate court order in violation of the ECPA, the statute "speaks
nothin about the suppression of information in a court proceeding").
Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
'











searches and seizures 'proscribes only governmental action; it is wholly
inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a
private individual."' 193
Kennedy thus indicates how easy it would be for the FBI to surreptitiously
use Carnivore to find incriminating evidence, use a phony phone call as an
"anonymous caller" to report the incident to the ISP, and then wait for the ISP to
report the incident to the FBI. Using the information provided by the ISP, the FBI
could then execute further valid warrants. Though the Kennedy court claimed that
the defendant had not met the burden of establishing that the anonymous caller
was an FBI agent, this evidence would be virtually impossible for any criminal
defendant to put forward.
A response to these fears is that the FBI can be trusted to not exceed the
bounds of the law and to use Carnivore properly. However, the past history of the
FBI, as well as recent instances of its abuse of the justice system, indicate that the
FBI cannot be trusted to monitor Carnivore itself and must be subject to some
neutral oversight. During the reign of Director J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI was
notorious for exceeding the bounds of citizens' privacy rights. For example,
Director Hoover personally authorized "a series of break-ins and allegedly illegal
wiretaps" during investigations of the families and friends of Weather
Underground fugitives. 194 Though the FBI's excesses have lessened since that
time, there have been many recent instances of the FBI overstepping its authority.
One such example was the FBI's program of targeting Arab-Americans for
interviews regarding terrorism in 1991.195 Another example was the scandal that
plagued the FBI's operation of its crime lab in 1997. In a report, the Inspector
General at the time, Michael Bromwich, reported that agents at the lab gave
"scientifically flawed and inaccurate testimony" in court, and that the agents
made "errors that repeatedly favored prosecution cases. ' 96 These instances of
misconduct by the FBI demonstrate that unsupervised use of Carnivore could
easily lead to abuse. In the end, judicial supervision of the FBI's use of Carnivore
will be necessary to prevent the Orwellian situation of 1984-where everyone's
thoughts and writings are being probed by an overbearing, omnipotent, and
intrusive federal government.
VII. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD MUZZLE CARNIVORE
As the Supreme Court aptly noted in Berger v. New York, "[flew threats to
liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping
'
93 Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
.9 Timothy S. Robinson, Testimony Cites Hoover Approval of Black-Bag Jobs, WASH.
POST, July 13, 1978, at A4.
19' The F.B.L Is Calling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,1991, at A20.
196 Inspector Criticizes FBI Crime Lab, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 16, 1997, at 4A.
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devices.' 97 Carnivore is a powerful tool at the FBI's disposal. With it, not only
can federal agents search anyone's e-mail messages from the comfort of their
own office, but they can potentially monitor someone's Internet usage as well.' 9
The problems with Carnivore are clear: There are too many possibilities that
Carnivore will intercept more e-mail than necessary, too few-protections imposed
by federal constitutional and statutory law, and an outright absence of sufficient
judicial supervision of the FBI.
A. Nhat Should Be Done?
The solution to many of the issues posed by Carnivore lies in the hands of
Congress. Short of banning the use of Carnivore, Congress has the ability to
enhance the Title II and ECPA protections and ensure that the FBI does not have
too much discretion in conducting e-mail intercepts. The Internet was in its
infancy when the ECPA was passed in 1986, and Internet usage, as well as
technology for intercepting Internet information like Carnivore, has since
soared.' 99 An amendment to the ECPA must respond to the changing nature of
the Internet and its steadily increasing popularity.
To that end, Congress should start by extending the statutory suppression
remedy to include electronic intercepts. This is what is currently done for oral and
wire intercepts, and public policy dictates that it should be done for electronic
intercepts as well.2° Without a suppression remedy, the FBI has no real incentive
to ensure that they are following the protections Congress established with Title
M and the ECPA. Knowing that their investigations will be in jeopardy if the
provisions of Title III are not followed, investigators will be forced to use
reasonable procedures to minimize the interception of non-pertinent
communications and to ensure that the scope of the wiretaps does not go beyond
the requirements of the wiretap order. Additionally, Congress should establish a
regime under which electronic communication intercepts are monitored by a
neutral and detached magistrate. It is insufficient for judges to conduct their
monitoring on the basis of progress reports made up by the same people (i.e., FBI
agents) who are trying to maintain and preserve the intercept operation.20 1 A
judicial oversight regime where a representative of the judiciary would conduct
197 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
'9' See Carnivore Independent Review, supra note 3, at xiii (noting that Carnivore can
monitor HTTP files retrieved by a target individual).
'99 See Dempsey, supra note 123, at 80-82 (noting that when the ECPA was enacted in
1986 only 50,000 computers were hooked to the Internet, but by 1996 that number had
increased to over 9.4 million with 40 million people worldwide utilizing the Internet and noting
that "[e]-mail is in some respects easier to intercept than regular mail," and to that end, law
enforcement officials have taken advantage of this weakness and developed new technologies
for interception).200 See Leib, supra note 176 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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minimization and/or observe the use of Carnivore would be a reasonable means to
ensure that the public's rights under the Fourth Amendment and Title M are
protected. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in Tamura ratified a similar regime ofjudicial
oversight.0 2 Congress should also close the gaps in the minimization requirement
and require a higher showing of necessity when officers seek to justify non-
minimized interception of e-mail. Additionally, a complete ban on the ability of
law enforcement officials to seize non-relevant e-mail at the beginning of the
investigation for the purpose of identifying patterns of criminal activity should be
considered.
With regard to pen registers, Congress should amend the ECPA to require an
increased justification for judicial orders authorizing the interception of routing
and addressing information in light of the fact that this data can reveal extensive
information about an Internet user. Because Internet addressing and routing
information reveals far more information than telephone numbers (to which pen
registers and trap and trace devices were originally applied), it is necessary for
Congress to increase the required justification for a pen/ trap order to mirror the
probable cause requirement used in traditional wiretap orders. 203
Finally, in light of the revelations that it has not yet been determined whether
or not Carnivore can safely conduct searches without over-collection of non-
pertinent e-mails, it may be wise for Congress to consider new policies
surrounding implementation of such search devices by the FBI.204 For example,
when should an electronic communication interception device be cleared for full-
time law enforcement use? Unlike the FBI's current implementation of
Carnivore, it should be necessary for the FBI to seek review of Carnivore's
operation through an independent testing process to evaluate its integrity.2 5
21 See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring
impoundment of seized documents and subsequent intervention of a magistrate where
documents are intermingled making separation of relevant versus irrelevant documents
difficult).
2o' See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1994) (requiring probable cause for wiretap order); Bellovin,
supra note 50 and accompanying text (noting "potential over-collection in pen mode").2 4 Id.; see Kevin Poulsen, Report: Carnivore Needs Work, SEcuRrrYFocus NEWS, at
http://www.securityfocus.com (Nov. 22, 2000).205 See id. (noting criticisms that review of Carnivore by the Illinois Institute of
Technology Research Institute had "ties to the Clinton administration").
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